Three Theoretical Approaches:

• New institutionalism – i.e. institutions matter. They matter in how we compare politics. Institution-centred approach to comparative politics.
• ‘Hard’ institutions – formal rules often written into constitution or law. Enforced through formal apparatus.
• ‘Soft’ institutions – informal rules often unspoken and created in culture and tradition. Enforced through informal sanctions e.g. through ostracism.
  

 Rational Choice:

• Individuals always make deliberate and conscious choices in pursuit of their personal goals.
• Individuals are self-interested and are maximizers – they seek the outcome which is of most benefit to them.
• Even in collective settings, the individual is of focal concern. So collective action is explained by individuals rationally choosing to accomplish a given goal collectively, as it benefits the individuals.
• They calculate the costs and benefits of each action. E.G. One may vote in an election either to elect the representative that offers the greatest benefits to the, OR to oust a party which has failed to deliver what they promised.
• Collective goods and Free-Rider problem: When benefits from collective action are acquired without contributing any personal costs. E.G. environmental issues such as cleaner air. Being a free-rider is a rational choice as benefits are derived without costs.
• Principal vs. Agent Free-Rider problem: The action of individuals is often difficult to monitor in a collective organization. If agents are self-interested then it is easier for them to shirk any given responsibility. The size of the institution or organization is often related to the ease of monitoring.
• Free-riders may be reduced by giving incentives. Through ‘hard’ institutions, they would be punishable by law. Through ‘soft’, threat of ostracism may act as incentive to participate. E.G. Voting. Rational choice not to vote as one vote doesn’t make a difference. This causes low turnout. ‘Hard’ institutions are therefore imposed, such as compulsory voting, which denotes the costs of not voting i.e. a fine. Turnout therefore increases.
• However, are we always self-interested? It is also not possible for individuals to know every single possibility and what its maximum utility is.

Cultural Theory:

• The role of widely shared ideas and beliefs.
• Individual perceptions are largely a product of the social environment.
• They make decisions in a manner which reflects prevailing ideas and beliefs widely shared by members of their communities.
• Decisions can reflect an emotional response.
• A more group level analysis is preferred: methodological holism.
• Internalised cultural norms occur without rationality.
• Sheer diversity in political institutions can be accounted for by the sheer diversity in culture.
• [Almond and Verba] There are similar cultural traits across countries which enable us to predict similar political outcomes.
• Changes are a product of evolution and historical accidents.
• Specificity of cultural norms means that it is difficult to create a universal political theory and prediction on behaviour.

 Structural Theory:

• Denies individuals are the principal actors on the social stage.
• Institutions and social structures exercise power in their own right.
• Institutions actually create the beliefs that individuals and groups have.
• The system itself is a primary actor.
• Denounces the significance of culture.
• Recognizes what underlying dynamics are present within a social system as a whole. E.G. capitalism, globalization, the nation-state, technology etc.
• Social arrangements are not rationally chosen, nor are they the subject of historical accidents.
• E.G. Turnout. Ease of voting i.e. how far the polling station, or how easy it is to register, will further affect turnout at elections. France(80%), 18 year olds are automatically registered, in UK confusing online or postal registration system (60% 2005).
  

 Possibility of Synthesis:

• BETWEEN RATIONAL CHOICE AND CULTURAL THEORY:
  • Some versions of rational choice theory recognize the role played by socialization in shaping an individual actors sense of identity, so long as it is not suggested that people are constituted wholly by their cultural surroundings.
  • Focus on the manner in which institutional rules may operate to block certain forms of social change. This suggests societies may become ‘locked in’ to institutional arrangements owing to random historical accidents, where the benefits of consuming a good depend positively on the number of other individuals who do so. Therefore, random cultural and historical events might account for the existence of particular institutional rules, but individual rational choice may help to explain whether or not adherence to these rules is likely to be stable.
  • (With weaker variants of rational choice) believe the process of institutional change is affected by the ideas held by individuals and groups about desirable institutional forms.
• BETWEEN CULTURAL AND STRUCTURAL THEORY:
  • Gramsci [neo-Marxist theorist] believes that while the structure of capitalist society is based on the structural conflict of interest between bourgeoisie and proletariat, the specific manifestation of this conflict will be dependent on the particular cultural circumstances of the country concerned.
  • Economic forces affect the interests that particular classes in a given structure possess but do not determine how actors will subjectively perceive these interests.
  • Different institutional structures provide different incentives and opportunities for actors to challenge prevailing cultural norms.

• BETWEEN RATIONAL CHOICE AND STRUCTURAL MARXISM:
  • Social institutions have a tendency to approach optimality. Both allow little room for the role of ideas and the possibility of human error in understanding the process of institutional development.
    

 Problems Applying Paradigms:

• Herbert Simon’s ‘bounded rationality’.
• Individuals cannot always base their decisions on a cool computation of benefits over costs.
• Human brain is fundamentally limited in its capacity to process information and to make computations and must, therefore, resort to habits, traditions and rules of thumb.